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IMPERATIVES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE ON CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP IN NIGERIA
PROFESSOR DR. S. GOZIE OGBODO*
DR. GODWIN LUKE UMORU**
ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to examine and interrogate the conceptual
ideas and frameworks of corporate governance; its relationship
and relevance to corporate citizenship and the elements that de-
scribe what is meant by corporate citizenship.  Various perspec-
tives of the role which corporate governance plays as a major
influence on corporate citizenship and corporate social responsi-
bility were clearly shown. Also shown is the meaning which is
ascribed to corporate governance, its core principles, the rheto-
ric and realities concerning the effect of a corporation’s pursuit
of power and profit on corporate citizenship, legal and social
responsibilities and the significant paradigm shift. Situating the
concept of corporate governance with corporate citizenship
shows an interrelationship between the former and the latter.
Consequently, this paper revealed that in the long run the mar-
ket mechanism should be able to provide additional resources to
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those companies which are best at maximizing and adhering to
the principles of corporate governance for the promotion of
good corporate citizenship.
INTRODUCTION
Research on corporate governance globally seems to have established
common phenomenon despite the diversities of each country’s economic
systems. This is also without prejudice to the different systems of capital
markets, irregular security issues, structures of corporate ownership,
shareholders protection, dividend policies and efficiency of investment
allocation.1 These common observed phenomena can be attributed to
how well the national laws protect outside investors. This is also because
the protection of shareholders and creditors are functions of the legal
system in place which invariably influences the understanding of the pat-
terns of corporate finances of nations and cumulatively consist of both
public and private finances.
Also, in a converging world where the gospel of free markets and de-
mocracy is resonating more than ever before, and given the far-reaching
impact of companies’ operations on the wealth of the nations, its bio-
diversity and the necessity for distribution of resources for economic
well-being, it is becoming increasingly clear that the governance of com-
panies2 must matter, as does political governance and duties of its citi-
zens.3 In effect, the relevance of corporate governance principles in
corporate administration is beyond any question, especially as the perva-
sive relevance of its principles has been largely attributable to the ad-
verse consequences of non-compliance with the provisions of corporate
governance codes all over the world.4
This paper, therefore, seeks to examine and interrogate the conceptual
ideas and frameworks of corporate governance, its relationship and rele-
vance to corporate citizenship and the elements that describe what is
meant by corporate citizenship.  Various perspectives of the role which
corporate governance plays as a major influence on corporate citizenship
and corporate social responsibility will be examined. The meaning which
1. R. La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 2-27
(2000).
2. Generally representing corporations, family owned businesses, small and medium scale
enterprises and business associations.
3. O.O. Solanke, Corporate Governance Issues in Financial Reporting – The Cadbury Chal-
lenge, Business Law Conference of NBA (Mar. 12 – 14, 2007).
4. G.L. Umoru, Legal Imperatives of Corporate Citizenship and Responsibility in Nigeria 282
(2014) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Nigeria).
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is ascribed to corporate governance, its core principles, the rhetoric and
realities concerning the effect of a corporation’s pursuit of power and
profit on corporate citizenship, legal and social responsibilities and any
significant paradigm shift will be demonstrated. The ultimate goal is to
situate the concept of corporate governance with corporate citizenship
with a view to showing the inter-relationship between the former and the
latter. It will also suggest a conceptual approach to bridge the two
concepts.
The imperative of the above undertaking is premised on the presumption
that the engagement of corporations in corporate social activities as cor-
porate citizens depends a great deal on the nature of corporate govern-
ance. In order to appreciate this point, it is worthwhile to first examine
the concept of corporate governance, corporate citizenship and their rela-
tionship with a view that it may invariably translate to good governance.
I. DEFINING AND UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
There are diverse viewpoints or opinions about the term corporate gov-
ernance by different scholars and researchers.5 In one viewpoint, held by
scholars L.C. Opara and A.J. Alade, corporate governance refers to the
system by which corporations are directed and controlled. This is be-
cause governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and re-
sponsibilities among different participants in the corporation (such as the
board of directors, managers, shareholders, creditors, auditors, regula-
tors, and other stakeholders) and specifies the rules and procedures for
making decisions in corporate affairs.6 The term “corporate governance”
describes also “the framework of rules, relationships, systems and
processes within and by which authority is exercised and controlled
within corporations. The term also encompasses the mechanisms by
which companies and those in control are held to account.”7 Good corpo-
5. See generally J. O. AMMUPITAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: MODELS AND PRINCIPLES
(Hilltop Publishers 2008); PRASAD KESHO, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Princtice-Hall of India Pri-
vate Ltd. 2006); A. DUNLOP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL (The Chartered Institute of
Management Accountants 1998); DONALD H. CHEW & STUART L. GILLAN, CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE AT THE CROSSROADS (McGraw Hill/Irwin 2005); INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (A. Chong & Lopez-de-Silances eds., The Inter-American Development Bank 2007);
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Harvard Business School Press 2000).
6. L.C. Opara & A.J. Alade, The Legal Regime of Corporate Governance in Nigeria: A Criti-
cal Analysis, 26 J.L. POL’Y & GLOBALISATION 38 (2014).
7. Australia, HIH Royal Commission & Justice N. Owen, A Corporate Collapse and Its Les-
sons xxx (Commonwealth of Australia 2003).
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rate governance promotes investor confidence, which is crucial to the
ability of all listed entities in the stock exchange to compete for capital.
Corporate governance covers a large number of distinct concepts and
phenomena, as evidenced from the globally adopted definition of the
concept by the Organisation of Economic Corporation and Development
(OECD) to the effect that corporate governance is:
the system by which business corporations are directed and con-
trolled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distri-
bution of rights and responsibilities among different participants
in the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders
and other stakeholders and spells out the rules and procedures
for making decisions in corporate affairs. By doing this, it also
provides the structure through which the company objectives
are set and the means of attaining those objects and monitoring
performance.8
Even nations are not left out of the efforts to define the concept of corpo-
rate governance. According to the India’s SEBI Committee on Corporate
Governance, it defines corporate governance as the:
acceptance by management of the inalienable rights of share-
holders as the true owners of the corporation and of their own
role as trustees on behalf of the shareholders. It is about com-
mitment to values, about ethical business conduct and about
making a distinction between personal and corporate funds in
the management of a company.9
Lately, corporate governance has been comprehensively defined as “a
system of law and sound approaches by which corporations are directed
and controlled focusing on the internal and external corporate structures
with the intention of monitoring the actions of management and directors
and thereby mitigating agency risks which may stem from the misdeeds
of corporate officers.”10
No doubt the various view points above invariably reflect their respective
experiences and backgrounds. Another fallout from the above definitions
8. SEC. & EXCH. BD. INDIA, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003),
http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/corpgov.pdf.
9. Id.
10. A. Sifuna, Disclose or Abstain: The Prohibition of Insider Trading on Trial, 12 J. INT’L
BANKING L. & REG. 9 (2012).
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will show that the corporate governance framework  invariably consists
of elements of first, explicit and implicit contracts between the company
and the stakeholders for distribution of responsibilities, rights, and re-
wards. Secondly, it is a procedure for reconciling the sometimes conflict-
ing interests of stakeholders in accordance with their duties, privileges,
and roles. Thirdly, it is a procedure for proper supervision, control, and
information-flows to serve as a system of checks-and-balances. In effect,
the concept refers to the relationship that exists between the various cor-
porate actors which helps in defining the direction and performance of a
corporation.11 The main actors are the chief executive officer (CEO); the
board of directors and the shareholders. Other actors that can influence
corporate governance are the staff, suppliers, customers, creditors, gov-
ernment and the community.
II. BASIS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Over centuries, the concept of corporate governance has evolved usually
in response to corporate failure such as the South Sea Bubble in the
1700s12 that led to the revolutionized business laws and practices in En-
gland. By way of benefits, R. Kyte, a member of the World Bank Group,
holds the views that good corporate governance practices instill in com-
panies the essential vision, processes, and structures to make decisions
that ensure longer-term sustainability.13 He pointed out that, more than
ever, we need companies that can be profitable and can achieve environ-
mental, social and economic value for the society. In like manner, an-
other scholar, A. Nkwachukwu, emphasized the growing consensus to
the effect that corporate governance has a positive link to national eco-
nomic growth and development.14
11. Without prejudice to the exhaustive definition of a corporation in Chapter II, a corporation
is an invincible, intangible and artificial body, which exists in the eyes of the law.
12. Going by the narratives of Ellen Castelow, in 1720, in return for a loan of £7 million to
finance the war against France, the House of Lords passed the South Sea Bill, which allowed the
South Sea Company a monopoly in trade with South America. The company underwrote the English
National Debt, which stood at £30 million, on a promise of 5% interest from the government. Shares
immediately rose to 10 times their value, speculation ran wild and all sorts of companies, some
lunatic, some fraudulent or just optimistic were launched. The stocks crashed and people all over the
country lost all of their money. Porters and ladies maids who had bought their own carriages became
destitute almost overnight. The Clergy, Bishops and the Gentry lost their life savings; the whole
country suffered a catastrophic loss of money and property. The South Sea Bubble of 1720, HISTORIC
UK, http://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofEngland/south-sea-bubble/ (last visited Feb.
14, 2017).
13. WORLD BANK, NAVIGATING THROUGH CRISES: A HANDBOOK FOR BOARDS (International
Finance Corp. 2010), available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/163831468161083824
/Navigating-through-crises-a-handbook-for-boards.
14. A. Nwachukwu, Understanding Share Registration in Nigeria: Contemporary Issues on
Management (America Ltd., 2007).
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The checks and balances in organization he posited, are strengthened
through the framework of the concept. Directors without corporate gov-
ernance enforcement mechanism may paint a misleading picture of fi-
nancial performance of their company to lure unsuspecting investors.
Such window dressed accounts raised concern in different parts of the
world for the past years, including the U.S. and Nigeria.  In the U.S.,
stories portraying sad corporate ethics (or lack thereof) with the collapse
of the energy corporation ENRON in 2001 which filed for bankruptcy
after adjusting its accounts.15  Other failed corporations include World
Com, Global Crossing, Anderson,16 Merrill Lynch, Martha Stewart,
Qwest Communication, Tyco International, Adelphia Communications,
Computer Associates, Parmalat, Putman, Boeing and Rite Aid. It is perti-
nent to state that each of these crises was often as a result of corporate
failure occasioned by incompetence, fraud and abuse. On each occasion
new elements of an improved system of corporate governance were also
instituted. According to one scholar in the field, J.N. Dogo, in the pro-
cess of continuous change, developed nations have had to establish a
complex mosaic of laws, regulations, institutions and implementation
strategies and capacity building of the government and private sector.17
The systematic enforcement of law and regulation created a culture of
compliance that has shaped business culture and the management of the
ethos of firms, spurring them to improve as a means of attracting human
financial resources on the best possible terms. This continuous process of
change and adaptation has accelerated with the increasing diversity and
complexity of shareholders and stakeholders. Globalization too, is forc-
ing many companies to tap into international financial markets and to
face greater competition.  This has led to restructuring and a greater role
for merger and acquisitions and to expanded markets for corporate
control.
15. Enron Corp. was a company that reached dramatic heights, only to face a dizzying collapse.
The story ends with the bankruptcy of one of America’s largest corporations. Enron’s collapse af-
fected the lives of thousands of employees and shook Wall Street to its core. At Enron’s peak, its
shares were worth $90.75, but after the company declared bankruptcy on December 2, 2001, they
plummeted to $0.67 by January 2002. To this day, many wonder how such a powerful business
disintegrated almost overnight and how it managed to fool the regulators with fake, off-the-books
corporations for so long. Enron Scandal: The Fall of a Wall Street Darling, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/updates/enron-scandal-summary/#ixzz> (last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
16. Arthur Andersen, which signed off on Enron’s and WorldCom’s books, was the only firm
convicted of obstruction of justice related to the scandals, and the once proud accounting giant was
later to be prohibited from auditing public companies.
17. J.N. Dogo, An Appraisal of the Legal Framework for Corporate Governance in Nigeria 38
(2011) (unpublished LL.M. dissertation, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria).
6
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 23 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol23/iss1/6
2018] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA 139
In Nigeria, the imperatives of corporate governance were emphasized by
the Atedo Peterside Committee report to the effect that:
the importance of effective governance to corporate and eco-
nomic performance cannot be overemphasized in today’s global
market place. Companies perceived to be adopting international
best corporate governance practice are more likely to attract in-
ternational investors than those whose practices are perceived to
be below international standards.18
The case of Cadbury Nigeria Plc, sent the first signal when, in October
2006, its board notified the public, including its shareholders and regula-
tory bodies, of the discovery of “overstatement” in its accounts, which
according to the company, started in 2003.19 Also in recent years, the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), under some intervention procedures, had
to sack the boards of several banks like Spring Bank Plc and Wema Bank
Plc, and take over the leadership of the said banks in order to assure the
safety of depositor’s funds and clip a threatened contagion from en-
gulfing the Nigerian banking system. Amongst other reasons, this CBN
step was necessitated by corporate governance failures in the affected
financial institutions.
Some of the failures were attributable to falling stock markets, corporate
failures, dubious accounting practices, and abuses of corporate power.
Criminal investigations indicate that the entire economic system upon
which investment returns have depended is showing signs of stress that
have undermined investor confidence. The increasing incidence of cor-
porate fraud relating to exaggerated and overstated accounts in what they
term “financial engineering” has informed the renewed global emphasis
on the need for effective corporate governance without being over-
bloated. The Central Bank of Nigeria, in 2006, reported that despite the
significance of good corporate governance to national economic develop-
ment and growth, corporate governance was still at a rudimentary stage
as only 40% of publicly quoted companies, including banks, had recog-
nized corporate governance in place. However, the legitimacy or legal
18. A Joint Committee of SEC and CAC set up in 2000 to identify the weaknesses in the
Nigerian Corporate Governance practices.
19. Cadbury Nigeria Plc, like another foreign owned firm before it, Lever Brothers Nigeria Plc
(now Unilever), deviated from the norm. Following the discovery of irregularities in its audited
accounts in October, 2006 and an independent audit carried out by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC),
Cadbury had the decency in December, 2006 to admit a significant and deliberate overstatement of
its financial statements since 2003.
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justification for corporate citizenship often now and again raise some
questions in relation to principles and models.
III. PRINCIPLES AND MODELS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
A. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Current discourse on corporate governance tends to refer to principles
raised in three documents released since 1990. These are: the U.K.
Cadbury Report 199220; the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 200221; and the
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Prin-
ciples of Corporate Governance, 1998 and 2004.22  The Cadbury and
OECD reports informed the present general principles around which
businesses are expected to operate to assure proper governance. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, on the contrary, is an attempt by the federal govern-
ment in the United States to legislate several of the principles recom-
mended in the Cadbury and OECD reports. The principles formulated
from the three reports above which compel companies to perform their
social responsibilities as good corporate citizens are discussed below.
20. “The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, forever after known as
the Cadbury Committee, was established in May 1991 by the Financial Reporting Council, the
London Stock Exchange, and the accountancy profession. The spur for the Committee’s creation
was an increasing lack of investor confidence in the honesty and accountability of listed companies,
occasioned in particular by the sudden financial collapses of two companies, wallpaper group
Coloroll and Asil Nadir’s Polly Peck consortium: neither of these sudden failures was at all fore-
shadowed in their apparently healthy published accounts.” The Cadbury Report, UNIV. CAMBRIDGE
JUDGE BUS. SCHOOL, http://cadbury.cjbs.archios.info/report (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
21. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is an act passed by U.S. Congress in 2002 to
protect investors from the possibility of fraudulent accounting activities by corporations. The SOX
Act mandated strict reforms to improve financial disclosures from corporations and prevent account-
ing fraud. The SOX Act was created in response to accounting malpractice in the early 2000s, when
public scandals such as Enron Corporation, Tyco International plc, and WorldCom shook investor
confidence in financial statements and demanded an overhaul of regulatory standards.
22. “Originally developed by the OECD in 1999, then updated in 2004, the 2015 revision of
the Principles of Corporate Governance addresses these and other emerging issues that are increas-
ingly relevant. Building on the expertise and experience of policy makers, regulators, business and
other stakeholders from around the world, the Principles provide an indispensable and globally rec-
ognized benchmark for assessing and improving corporate governance. The Principles have been
adopted as one of the Financial Stability Board’s key standards for sound financial systems, and
have been used by the World Bank Group in more than 60 country reviews worldwide. They also
serve as the basis for the guidelines on corporate governance of banks issued by the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision.” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD],
G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), https://www.oecd.org/corporate/principles-
corporate-governance.htm.
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1. Rights and Equitable Treatment of Shareholders
Under this principle, organizations are expected to respect the rights of
shareholders and help shareholders to exercise those rights. These rights
include the right to participate and vote at annual general meetings, elect
members of the board, obtain timely and regular information on the com-
pany and share in the profits of the company.23 On the ethical treatment
of shareholders, the concern here is particularly to ensure that the inter-
ests of minority and foreign shareholders are adequately protected. This
is achievable through the installation of a system that prevents insiders,
including managers and directors, from taking advantage of their posi-
tions through such practice as insider trading.
2. Interests of Other Stakeholders
This principle stipulates that organizations should recognize that they
have legal, contractual, social, and market driven obligations to non-
shareholders or stakeholders, including employees, investors, creditors,
suppliers, local communities, customers, and policy makers.24
3. Role and Responsibilities of the Board
The board needs sufficient relevant skills and understanding to review
and challenge management performance. It also needs adequate size and
appropriate levels of independence and commitment.25
4. Integrity and Ethical Behavior
This principle expects that integrity should be a fundamental requirement
in choosing corporate officers and board members. Organizations should
develop a code of conduct for their directors and executives that pro-
motes ethical and responsible decision making.26
23. See G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, arts. II, III; ADRIAN CADBURY, COM-
MITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & GEE & CO. LTD., REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 3.4 (1992); Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).
24. G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 22, pmbl., art. IV.
25. See G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 22, art. VI; CADBURY,
supra note 23, § 3.4.
26. CADBURY, supra note 23, §§ 3.2, 3.3, 4.33, 4.51, 7.4.
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5. Disclosure and Transparency
The principle here calls for organizations to clarify and make publicly
known the roles and responsibilities of board and management to provide
stakeholders with a level of accountability. They should also implement
procedures to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the
company’s financial reporting. Disclosure of material matters concerning
the organization should be timely and balanced to ensure that all inves-
tors have access to clear and factual information.27
B. MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
There are many different models of corporate governance around the
world. They differ according to the variety of capitalism in which they
are embedded. For instance, while the Anglo-American “model” tends to
emphasize the interests of shareholders, the Coordinated or Multi-stake-
holder Model is commonly associated with Continental Europe and Ja-
pan also recognizes the interests of workers, managers, suppliers,
customers, and the community.  Some scholars in the field have observed
that the related distinction is between market-orientated and network-ori-
entated models of corporate governance.28 The distinctions between the
models can be better appreciated as discussed herein.
1. Continental Europe
Some continental European countries, including Germany and the
Netherlands, require a two-tiered board of directors as a means of im-
proving corporate governance.29 In the two-tiered board, the executive
board, made up of company executives, is generally charged with the
responsibility of day-to-day operations while the supervisory board,
made up entirely of non-executive directors represents the shareholders
and employees. They can hire and fire the members of the executive
board, determine their compensation, and review major business
decisions.30
27. G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 22, arts. I, V.
28. S. DOUMA & H. SCHREUDER, ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO ORGANISATIONS ch. 15 (Pearson
5th ed. 2013).
29. T. BOB, ESSENTIALS FOR BOARD DIRECTORS: AN A-Z GUIDE 35 (Bloomberg Press 2d ed.
2009).
30. THE GERMAN TWO-TIER BOARD (AUFSICHTSRAT), A GERMAN VIEW ON CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS (K.J. Hopt et al. eds.,
de Gruyter 1975).
10
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 23 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol23/iss1/6
2018] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA 143
2. India
The India’s SEBI Committee on Corporate Governance definition sug-
gested that the Indian approach is drawn from the Gandhian principle of
trusteeship and the directive principles of the Indian Constitution, but
this conceptualization of corporate objectives is also prevalent in Anglo-
American and most other jurisdictions.31
3. United Kingdom & United States
The “Anglo-American model” of corporate governance which empha-
sizes the interests of shareholders, relies on a single-tiered board of direc-
tors that is normally dominated by non-executive directors elected by
shareholders. As a result of this, it is also referred to as “the unitary
system.”32 Within this system, many boards include some executives
from the company (who are ex officio members of the board). Non-exec-
utive directors are expected to out-number executive directors and hold
key posts, including audit and compensation committees. The United
States differ from the United Kingdom and Nigeria in one critical respect
with regard to corporate governance. In the United Kingdom and Nige-
ria, the CEO generally does not also serve as chairman of the board,
whereas in the U.S. having the dual role is the norm, despite major mis-
givings regarding the impact on corporate governance.33
In the United States, corporations are directly governed by state laws,
while the securities and stock exchange operations are governed by fed-
eral legislation. Many states in the U.S. have adopted the Model Business
Corporation Act, but the dominant state law for publicly traded corpora-
tions is of Delaware, which continues to be the place of incorporation for
the majority of publicly traded corporations.34 Individual rules for corpo-
rations are based upon the corporate charter and, less authoritatively, the
corporate by-laws. Shareholders cannot initiate changes in the corporate
charter although they can initiate changes to the corporate by-laws.
31. A. Afsharipour, Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons from Indian Experience, 29
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 16 (2009).
32. CADBURY, supra note 23. See also C.A. MALLIN, HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE: A COUNTRY ANALYSES (Edwad Elgar Publishing 2d ed. 2011).
33. W.G. BOWEN, THE BOARD BOOK: AN INSIDER’S GUIDE FOR DIRECTORS AND TRUSTEES 121
(W.W. Norton & Co. 2008).
34. L.A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 23 HARVARD L. REV. 118
(2004).
11
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4. Nigerian Model
Nigeria has a legal framework derived from British common law and
similar commercial codes to deal with issues relating to corporate gov-
ernance.35 The main corporate code is the Companies and Allied Matters
Act (CAMA).36 This Act contains several sections dealing with issues of
corporate governance, from directors, shareholders and their rights.
Under section 334(1) of the Act, directors shall, in respect of each year
of the company, prepare financial statements for the year. Also, section
334(2) lists what the financial statement should contain and necessary
signatures are required under section 343(2)(b). Further, the Act requires,
among other disclosures, the director’s emoluments which shall be deter-
mined by the company in general meeting37 and any interest the direc-
tors, including their relations, may have with the company in relation
with any transaction. The accounts are also to be prepared in accordance
with the Nigerian Standards, which an independent auditor so appointed
from persons belonging to a body of accountants must audit.38 It is also
expected that in publicly listed companies, a report by the Audit Com-
mittee, of which not more than three executive directors and three non-
executive directors must examine, review accounting and internal
controls.
Nigeria has its own codes of corporate governance and they are four in
number – Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 200639, National Pension
Commission (PENCOM) 200840, for all listed pension operators, Na-
tional Insurance Commission (NAICOM) 2009 and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) 2011.41 The basic guidelines on company
listing and detailed regulations covered in the Nigerian Stock Exchange
and the Securities and Exchange Commission are provided by CAMA
and ISA. A code of best practices for public companies in Nigeria was
35. Dogo, supra note 17.
36. Companies and Allied Matters Act (1990) Cap. (C20) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria
2004, § 267.
37. Id. § 267.
38. Id. § 358.
39. For banks in Nigeria, post-consolidation is effective from April 3, 2006.
40. This is a code of corporate governance for licensed pension operators. The Code is based
on internationally accepted principles of good corporate governance and its requirements are consis-
tent with the provisions of the Pension Reform Act 2004, rules, regulations and guidelines issued by
the Commission and are also considered transparent and enforceable.
41. Securities and Exchange Commission (2011) Cap. (C20) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria
2004.
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also developed. The code is voluntary and aimed at clarifying the respec-
tive responsibilities of directors for listed companies.42
The above code contains some notable elements, including the separation
of the roles of chairman and chief executive officer and a description of
the duties, number and required caliber of non-executive directors.43
Under the code, companies are required to form Audit Committees, re-
muneration committees and create an outline covering duties, appoint-
ment procedures, and constitutions of these committees.44
In 2006, the CBN also published a post-consolidation Code of Corporate
Governance for banks in Nigeria. This code was made mandatory and in
its introductory part emphasized the imperatives of corporate governance
for fund mobilization for monetary implementation policy and the neces-
sity for the consolidation in the banking policy industry.45
To align with international standards, the Nigerian Accounting Standards
Board, which derived its powers from section 7 of its Act, issued stan-
dards which are in conformity with international accounting standards
but adaptable to local conditions. The issuance of these standards by the
Minister of Commerce and Industry was to ensure that the action plan
and framework for smooth transition to the International Financial Re-
porting Standard46 are complied with by all reporting entities by January
2, 2012.
Essentially, the Nigerian corporate governance legal framework is gov-
erned by the provisions of the Investment and Securities Act (ISA)
200747; the Rules and Regulations of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC)48;49 the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA)50;
the PENCOM Code of Corporate Governance for Licensed Pension Ad-
42. The Code of Corporate Governance essentially aims to set out rules based on best practices
to guide PFAs (including CPFAs) and PFCs on the structures and processes to be used towards
achieving optimal governance set up.
43. Code of Corporate Governance Cap. (124) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (re-
pealed by Investment and Securities Act, 2007).
44. M. Maher & T. Andersson, OECD, Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance
and Economic Growth, at 12 (1999), https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/2090569.pdf.
45. J. Moon, A. Crane & D. Matten, Can Corporations Become Citizens? Corporate Citizen-
ship as a Metaphor for Business Participation in Society, 15 BUS. ETHICS Q. 427-51 (2005); Umoru,
supra note 4.
46. Principles based on set of accounting standards to establish broad rules as well as to dictate
specific treatment.
47. Investment and Securities Act (2007) Cap. (124) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004,
§ 267.
48. The Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] is a government agency mandated to
regulate and develop the Nigerian Capital Market.
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ministrators51 and the Investment and Securities Act52, 2004. The SEC
Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria, 2003, being voluntary, is im-
plemented on a comply-and-explain basis with a promise that by 2007
they may become legally binding.
Based on the various models examined above, this paper agrees with the
submission of Maher and Andersson that one of the most striking differ-
ences between corporate governance systems are the contrasts in the
ownership and control of firms that exist across countries. Corporate
governance system can be distinguished according to the degree of own-
ership concentration and the identity of controlling shareholder, just as it
is also a factor of firm performance and economic growth.53 Whichever
governance practices a listed entity chooses to adopt is fundamentally a
matter for its board of directors, the body charged with the legal respon-
sibility for managing its businesses with due care and diligence and
therefore, must ensure that it has appropriate governance arrangements in
place to advance good corporate citizenship.
IV. CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP
Corporate citizenship in the context of this paper is a term used to de-
scribe a company’s role in, or responsibility towards society. It is for this
reason the term is sometimes used interchangeably with corporate social
responsibility (CSR), business citizenship and so on. However, many
also take it to mean that corporations should be regarded as citizens
within a territory, that corporations should have citizenship of some
sort.54 This is usually based on the principle of corporate personhood, in
that in certain legal jurisdictions, such as the United States, companies
are afforded some of the same legal rights as individuals. If corporations
are ‘artificial persons’ under the law, it is necessary to determine the
extent to which they can also claim some of the entitlements, privileges
and protection of citizenship, such as rights to freedom of expression and
49. SEC Nigeria’s Consolidated Rules and Regulations as at 2013, SEC NIGERIA, http://
sec.gov.ng/sec-nigerias consolidated-rules-and-regulations-as-at-2013/.
50. Companies and Allied Matters Act (1990) Cap. (C20) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria
2004.
51. The Code of Corporate Governance essentially aims to set out rules based on best practices
to guide PFAs (including CPFAs) and PFCs on the structures and processes to be used towards
achieving optimal governance set up.
52. Investment and Securities Act (2004) Cap. (124) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004,
repealed by Investment and Securities Act (2007).
53. Maher & Andersson, supra note 44.
54. Moon, Crane & Matten, supra note 45; Umoru, supra note 4.
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speech and political participation.55  Although this debate remains very
active, a more recent approach to corporate citizenship has also stressed
the political role of corporations in protecting or inhibiting the citizen-
ship rights of individuals, such as by taking over previous governmental
roles and functions56 or direct political activity, such as lobbying and
party financing. However, the debate on the concept was heightened by
the high-profile collapse of a number of large U.S. firms such as Enron
and MCI Inc. in 2001, occasioned by the global economic meltdown and
the near collapse of the banking sector in Nigeria post-consolidation era.
The major focus of the debate on the concept is on the principles of
fairness, transparency and accountability.
In order to make these principles very effective, certain mechanisms
have been designed by experts to control and reduce the inefficiencies
that could arise from moral hazard and adverse selection in relation to
corporate governance. For example, the behavior of managers can be
monitored and checked by an independent third party in the name of an
external auditor who can attest to the accuracy of the information pro-
vided by the management to investors. Other mechanisms of control for
the effectiveness of these principles include monitoring by the board of
directors, internal control procedures and internal auditors, balance of
power, standard remuneration, competition, takeovers, whistleblowers,
media pressure and surveillance, government regulation and so on.57
Subsequent codes of corporate governance were issued and will be out-
lined later in this paper. However, these codes were not only ingenious,
but also proactive as they appear to have mirrored almost all the duties of
directors towards repositioning of corporations as citizens just as cap-
tured under sections 279 through 284 of CAMA, 2004 of Nigeria and
sections 171 through 177 of the U.K. Companies Act 2006. Their influ-
ence on corporate governance vis-a-vis corporate citizenship will be dis-
cussed later in this paper.
V. LEGITIMACY OF CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP
Given that appropriate principles and models of corporate governance
are in place, the question quite often raised is whether companies should
engage at all in charitable giving as good corporate citizens. This ques-
tion is often raised because, traditionally, corporations as legal entities
55. F. Green, Corporations as Persons, Citizens, and Possessors of Liberty, 94 U. PA. L. REV.
202-37 (l946).
56. Moon, Crane & Matten, supra note 45.
57. L. Oso & B. Semiu, The Concept and Practice of Corporate Governance in Nigeria: The
Need for Public Relations and Effective Corporate Communication, 3 J. COMM. (2012).
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were not afforded the same treatment as individuals, in that their capacity
was viewed as being limited. The objects of a given corporation are usu-
ally well defined in its Memorandum of Association in order to establish
the suitability of corporations to deliver on their set objectives. One
scholar, A. Emiola, identified their variance and differentiated them to
establish their suitability to carry out wider responsibilities.58 This was
after their legal personality and how their creation had been established.
This was in order to differentiate their legal rights and obligations in
countries where they operate.
In all the jurisdictions, the powers of corporations are defined by the
statute or its constitutive instrument, but generally most, if not all, corpo-
rations are capable of bearing rights and discharging obligations as any
other person. A corporation has this capacity because it is an artificial
person and thus an abstraction without any mind of its own and can
therefore only express its corporate will through the agency of human
beings.59 Therefore, any act inconsistent with the specified objects in the
company’s objects clause was considered to be void ab initio and was,
by virtue of its being void, incapable of being rectified – even by 100
percent of the shareholders.60 According to another scholar, Brandon
Vaidyanathan, in the nineteenth century, several court rulings rendered
the use of corporate funds for charitable purposes effectively illegal.61
For instance, in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge62 the court ruled
against the use of corporate funds for activities unrelated to the chartered
aims of the corporation.  The same verdict was arrived at in the cases of
Davis et al. v. Old Colony Railroad Co. and Hutton v. West Cork Rail-
way Co.6364
In spite of the above rulings, corporations have always attempted to jus-
tify making contributions to schools, libraries, and engaging employees
from communities of their operations. According to scholar M.
Sharfman65, during the economic downturns, especially towards the end
58. A. EMIOLA, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: COMPANY LAW 25 (Emiola Publishers
2005).
59. Lennard’s Carrying v. A.G. Leventis & Co. Ltd., [l976] 1 All NLR (Part 1) 94 (Nigeria).
60. B.R. Martin, The Validity of Corporate Gifts, 8 PHILANTHROPIST (Oct. 1, 1988), available
at https://thephilanthropist.ca/original-pdfs/Philanthropist-8-1-710.pdf.
61. Brandon Vaidyanathan, Science of Generosity, Corporate Giving: A Literature Review 8
(Oct. 2008) (unpublished, on file with the Center for the Study of Religion and Society, University
of Notre Dame).
62. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837).
63. Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co., [1883] 23 Ch.D. 654 (Eng.).
64. M. Sharfman, Changing Institutional Rules: The Evolution of Corporate Philanthropy
1883-1953, 33 J. BUS. & SOC’Y 245 (1994).
65. Id.
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of the nineteenth century, corporations increasingly began to contribute
funds towards charitable purposes, and were able to defend themselves
against shareholders’ ultra vires claims in court by arguing that these
were legitimately business related, since they directly benefited
employees.66
Even as recent as the twentieth century, debates about the legitimacy of
such corporate giving continued to rage both in courts as well as in gen-
eral discourse.  Another scholar, R. Bremner, is of the opinion that the
forces that influenced this discourse include anti-business sentiment in
some contexts, which rejected corporate donations as being tainted or
defiled.67 Other factors that threaten the legitimacy of corporate giving,
according to scholar M. Sharfman, and make it increasingly difficult for
companies to ascertain criteria for donations are: the prevalence of lais-
sez-faire arguments claiming that it was immoral for companies to give
away shareholders’ money; increasing scrutiny of corporate activities by
journalists as well as the federal government; and a proliferation of chari-
table organizations.68 It is not unlikely that this is why several courts still
continue to rule against corporate charitable gestures. For instance,
scholars, C.M. Sasse and R.T. Trahan69, cited the ruling in Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., which set the precedent for the norm of shareholder
profit maximization.70 The ruling insisted that a “corporation is organ-
ized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders,” which
rendered inexcusable “the no distribution of profits among stockholders
in order to devote them to other purposes.”71
A twist came in the 1920s when both the federal and state governments
began to pass legislation to make it easier for corporations to donate
money. In general, there seemed to be growing public sentiment in favor
of corporate philanthropy. This is evidenced in the words of a prominent
business leader of the time in the U.S, in the person of Cyrus McCor-
mick, who held fast to the belief that “every company or organization of
men doing business in any community . . . is in duty bound to do some-
thing to help build that community aside from the things required by the
law or the things beneficial to itself.”72 According to Epstein, “Business
66. Main v. C.B. & Q Railways, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
67. R. BREMNER, AMERICA PHILANTHROPY 108 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1987).
68. Id.
69. C. M. Sasse & R.T. Trahan, Rethinking the New Corporation Philanthropy, 50 BUS. HORI-
ZONS 29-38 (2006).
70. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
71. Sorenson v. Chicago Railway Co. (l924) 199 N.W. 534.
72. V. Brudneyt, Corporate Charitable Donations: Shareholder Protection and Public Disclo-
sure, 52 COLUM. J.L. SOC. PROBS. 99 (1969).
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must be accountable to interests both within and without it. The account-
ability is essential to corporate legitimacy and the preservation of a soci-
ety that is democratic in fact as well as in theory.”73 Sharfman74 pointed
out the legal legitimization of corporate philanthropy was not established
until 1953, with the ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of A.P.
Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow et al.75 This ruling seemed to reflect
a growing perception of the positive role of the corporation in society.
This era saw the proliferation of several books emphasizing the “social
responsibilities” of business such as Bowen’s Social Responsibilities of
the Business Man76, Eell’s Corporate Giving in a Free Society77 and
Heald’s Management’s Responsibility to Society.78 This notion of “cor-
porate social responsibilities” became increasingly important, with sev-
eral scholars attempting to clarify and explain the concept through more
literature review on the subject matter, such as Carroll’s extensive review
of the early literature on CSR.79
In another account by Bella R. Martin,80 modern cases have escaped the
rigors of the “direct benefit” test in one of two ways. First, in one line of
authority the courts have held that a contribution ostensibly made for the
general welfare of society will be deemed to result, in fact, in profit max-
imization, meaning that socially responsible behavior creates goodwill.81
The courts have even gone so far as to respect the business judgment of
directors and have stated their preference not to interfere with a business
decision (presumably based on the profit motive) in the absence of an
allegation of fraud or illegality. For example, in the Union Pacific v.
Trustees case,82 Justice Henriod observed:
There seems to be no good reason to challenge the convictions
of these men, the bonafides of their support for the contribution
in question or their belief that it was for the best interests of the
company and its shareholders. If their personal judgment was
73. D.E. Schwartz, Objective and Conduct of the Corporation – Defining the Corporate Objec-
tive, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (1984).
74. Sharfman, supra note 64, at 255-56.
75. A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow et al., 13 N.J. 145 (1953).
76. Established under the  Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria Act No. 6, 2011.
77. R. EELLS, CORPORATE GIVING IN A FREE SOCIETY (Harper Brothers 1956).
78. M. HEALD, MANAGEMENT’S RESPONSIBILITY TO SOCIETY: THE GROWTH OF AN IDEA (Case
Western Reserve Univ. Press 1957).
79. A. Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct, 38 BUS.
& SOC’Y. 268-295 (1999).
80. Martin, supra note 60.
81. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (III. App. Ct. l968).
82. Union Pacific v. Trustees, 67 Que.S.C. 539, 539 (1929).
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unsound, it is not reflected in their record, in the expressed na-
tional and state legislative encouragement of such practice, in
the expressed opinions and thinking of members of legal groups
concerned with the matter, nor by the mushrooming statistics
dating from 1940 that clearly reflect an ever-increasing belief
on the part of those who manage and run institutions flying a
corporate ensign that it is sound business to contribute to agen-
cies fostering charity, church, science and school.83
Secondly, another line of authority supports the view that corporate phi-
lanthropy is a legitimate end in and of itself, but subject to a limit of
“reasonableness.”84 Reasonableness is generally assessed by having re-
gard to the customary level of such expenditures by companies of like
worth, and the strength of the link between the use of corporate resources
and the corporation’s business.85 The decision of the Quebec Superior
Court in Hamilton v. Bank of Montreal aptly captured it thus: “It is not
beyond the powers of the directors of a bank to adopt resolutions grant-
ing certain sums to hospitals, the more so when such directors are acting
in good faith and in accordance with a long established custom through-
out the country.”86 Having rested positively the justification for corpora-
tions to be socially responsible, the financial dispositions of such
corporations are often a factor of the regulatory framework.
VI. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK
The regulatory framework of corporate governance is a global phenome-
non. Consequently, just as there are universal codes for the practice of
the concept, there are also national codes. Such national codes are usu-
ally based on local peculiarities and needs, as well as the unique charac-
teristics of each nation. Regardless of whether it is global or national, the
regulatory framework of corporate governance can be viewed from two
broad perspectives: voluntary and mandatory.87
One such voluntary code is the Code of Best Practice of Public Compa-
nies in Nigeria. Mandatory codes are those relating to banks, as con-
83. Id.
84. Sorenson v. Chicago Railway Co., 199 N.W. 534 (l924).
85. Brudneyt, supra note 72.
86. Union Pacific v. Trustees, 67 Que.S.C. at 539.
87. I. Wilson, Regulatory and Institutional Challenges of Corporate Governance in Nigeria
Post Banking Consolidation, 12 NIGERIAN ECON. SUMMIT GROUP ECON. INDICATORS 1-10 (2006);
Oso & Semiu, supra note 57, at 6.
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tained in the following: CAMA 2004, the Banks and other Financial
Institutions Acts (BOFIA)88 l991, the Investment and Securities Act
(ISA) 2007, the Security and Exchange Commission Act (SECA) 1988,
the Central Bank of Nigeria Code of Conduct for Directors of Licensed
Banks and Financial Institutions and the Financial Reporting Council of
Nigeria.(FRCN).89 The FRCN, until its recent suspension, issued the Na-
tional Code of Corporate Governance 2016. The Code, which was made
pursuant to the powers of the FRCN under sections 50 and 51 of the Act,
had a commencement date of October 17, 2016. The Code is essentially a
consolidation and refinement of different sectoral codes on corporate
governance and has been issued in three parts: The Code of Corporate
Governance for Private Sector; the Code of Governance for Not-for-
Profit Entities90; and the Code of Governance for the Public Sector.91
The Code of Corporate Governance for the Private Sector is mandatory,
while that for the not-for-profit entities will become operative on a “com-
ply or justify non-compliance” basis in a manner similar to the United
Kingdom’s Corporate Governance Code. On the other hand, the Code of
Governance for the Public Sector will not become immediately operative
until an executive directive is secured from the federal government for
that Code to take effect.  Noteworthy is the directive that following the
harmonization and unification of the various codes that the codes for the
private sector will, with effect from October 17, 2016, supersede any
other corporate governance code in force in Nigeria before that date, and
that in the case of a conflict between the provisions of the private sector
code and any sectoral code or supplement thereto, the provisions of the
private sector code shall prevail to the extent of those inconsistencies.92
At the global level, there are three identified codes of corporate govern-
ance that are often cited and explicitly referred to in the development of
national codes. These are: Principles of Corporate Governance (l999) by
the OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance by the Commonwealth
88. Banks and other Financial Institutions Act (1991) Cap. (B3) Laws of the Federation of
Nigeria 2004.
89. Established under the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria Act No. (6) (2011).
90. This Code was recently suspended due to the protest of most religious bodies in the country
for non-compliance with due process.
91. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2011) 681 final
(Oct. 25, 2011), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/com/
com_com(2011)0681_/com_com(2011)0681_en.pdf.
92. For the avoidance of doubt, the issuance of the Private Sector Code does not prevent or
otherwise circumscribe the powers of the various sector regulators to issue new codes or corporate
governance or to supplement their existing codes. The Private Sector Code recognizes that such
regulators remain empowered to issue corporate governance guidelines on specific matters save that
such guidelines must be consistent with the Private Sector Code or be void.
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Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) and the King Report on
Corporate Governance for South Africa by the Institute of Directors of
South Africa (IoD), 1991.93 Countries that have drawn from the above
three codes include Kenya (Private Sector Corporate Governance Trust,
1999), Ghana (Manual on Corporate Governance, 2000), Nigeria (Codes
of Corporate Governance in Nigeria, 2003), South Africa (IoD, 1994 and
2004), Tanzania (Steering Committee on Corporate Governance in
Tanzania, 2000), Uganda (Manual on Corporate Governance and Code
of Conduct), Zambia (IoD of Zambia, 2000) and Zimbabwe (Principles
for Corporate Governance in Zimbabwe).94
It is interesting to note also that all the existing codes and laws in Nige-
ria, which entrust the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), Security
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Central Bank of Nigeria
(CBN) with the responsibility of regulating corporate governance, reflect
the key elements of the OECD and other global codes. These key ele-
ments include: separating the CEO and the board chairman; prescription
of non-executive and executive directors on the board; improving the
quality and performance of board membership; introducing merit as cri-
teria to hold top management positions; introducing transparency, due
process and disclosure requirements; transparency on financial and non-
financial reporting; protection of shareholders rights and privileges and
defining the composition, roles and duties of the Audit Committee.
Some of these key elements will be further discussed hereunder.
A. SEPARATING THE ROLE OF THE CEO AND THE BOARD CHAIRMAN
The management of a company’s affairs are ordinarily and ultimately
entrusted to its directors, some of whom may either be chief executive
officer (CEO) or chairman or a combination of both, commonly referred
to as chairman/chief executive officer in the business parlance. Separat-
ing the roles of chairman and CEO is not only internationally applicable,
but is also beneficial for the company. For example, the U.K. Combined
Code 2003 stipulates that “there should be a clear division of responsibil-
ities at the head of the company between the running of the board and the
executive responsibility for running the company’s business. No one in-
dividual should have unfettered powers of decision.”95 It is also statuto-
rily provided that a director owes fiduciary duties to the company and
93. G.J. Rossouw, Business Ethics and Corporate Governance, 44 AFR. BUS. & SOC’Y 94-106
(2005).
94. Oso & Semiu, supra note 57.
95. The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, 2003 (U.K.).
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will act as an agent of the company.96 Also, by virtue of section 283 of
CAMA, directors are trustees of the company’s monies, properties and
powers and as such must account for all the monies over which they
exercise control.97 A combination of the role of CEO and the board
chairman will invariably defeat the purpose of the above statutory provi-
sions. The separation of the roles, therefore, will provide the needed ad-
vantages inherent in the principles of checks and balances in any
organization. The combination of the roles will also defeat the provision
of section 279(3) of CAMA which provides that a director shall act at all
times in what he believes to be the best interests of the company as a
whole.98 A lack of checks and balances no doubt will not be in the inter-
est of the company as a whole.
B. PRESCRIPTION OF EXECUTIVE AND NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON
THE BOARD
The prescription of executive and non-executive directors on the board is
necessitated by the responsibilities attached to each. An executive direc-
tor is a director who has separate responsibilities within the company as
an executive. At the same time, the role of a non-executive director has a
positive contribution to making and ensuring that the board fulfills its
main objectives. A non-executive director can exercise an impartial in-
fluence and bring to bear experience gained from other fields in order to
appropriately advise the board of directors. This is because directors
must exercise their powers collectively. In applying some particular stan-
dards no distinction is drawn between executive and non-executive direc-
tors. For example, whether executive or non-executive, all directors have
the same responsibilities in law and all owe their duties to the company
as a whole, a breach of those duties may result in their being judged unfit
to be concerned in the management of a company. In the performance of
their duties, directors are expected to exhibit such a degree of skill as
may reasonably be expected from a person with their knowledge and
experience and to take such care as an ordinary person might be expected
to take in their own behalf. However, the distinction between executive
and non-executive directors in applying other standards is as stated
below:
96. Judge Dixon noted that “directors of a company are fiduciary agents, and power conferred
upon them cannot be exercised in order to obtain some private advantage or for any purpose foreign
to the power.” Mills v Mills (l938) 60 CLR 150, 186 (Austl.).
97. Companies and Allied Matters Act § 283.
98. Id. § 279(3).
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i. Executive directors are expected to devote their time and
energy to company matters in accordance with the terms of
their contract. In most cases, this will require them to
devote all their working time.
ii. Non-executive directors are not required to give continu-
ous attention to company affairs. However, they are ex-
pected to familiarize themselves with the company’s
affairs, including its financial position, and should attend
meetings of the board whenever they are reasonably able
to do so.
iii. Where a director, executive or non-executive, possesses a
particular professional skill, for example, as an accountant
or a lawyer, they are required to exhibit that skill or ability
as reasonably expected from a person in that profession.99
Both executive and non-executive directors are expected to exhibit equal
standards of care and as such, a board of directors, acts as a whole. Al-
though some of its members may be given additional powers by the arti-
cles or by resolution, the general duties and responsibilities are the same
for each director. If a breach of duty is to be attributed to a board on the
basis that all of its members were present at a meeting which had ap-
proved a wrongful act, then the liability of each director is joint and
several and no allowance is made for the fact that some work part-time
and may have acquiesced in a situation which they did not fully under-
stand, as was in the case of Re Lands Allotment Co.100 For the same
purposes, the directors are in the same position as trustees of a fund and
may be held liable for knowledge of wrongdoings in relation to dealings
with its property, such as in El Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings.101 It fol-
lows, therefore, that higher duties are owed by those who are employed
under service contracts or because of their professional skill. As far as
corporate governance is concerned, non-executives are usually associated
with independence and may be self-employed.
Premised on the above, recommendations that directors or senior execu-
tives of a listed entity should have a clear understanding of their roles
and responsibilities and of the entity’s expectation of them should be
reduced to a written agreement becomes apt. Usually, this agreement will
take the form of a letter of appointment in the case of non-executive
99. K. Aina, Board of Directors and Corporate Governance in Nigeria, INT’L J. BUS. & FIN.
MGMT. RES., 21-24 (2013).
100. Re Lands Allotment Co., [1894] 1 Ch. 616, 63 L.J. Ch. 291 (C.A.) (Eng.).
101. El Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings, (1994) 2 All E.R. 685, 1 B.C.L.C. 464 (C.A.) (Eng.).
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directors and a service contract in the case of an executive director or
other senior executive.102
C. IMPROVING THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF BOARD
MEMBERSHIP
Improving the quality and performance of board membership is a factor
of the quality and caliber of directors as the nature of directorship is
central to company law. This brings to fore issues of full-time executive
and part-time non-executive directorship. In large public companies,
good corporate practice generally requires that executive directors may
not control all aspect of management, especially in relation to their own
remunerations. Consequently, non-executive directors, generally drawn
from backgrounds which give the board useful perspectives on the com-
pany business, are used to decide issues which executive directors ought
not to decide alone and are used to advise the executive directors on the
most appropriate way for the company to act in a number of circum-
stances. The more complex the company or group of companies, the
more likely it is that different directors will have very different responsi-
bilities, all bringing in professionalism from their various fields of en-
deavors into the quality performance of the board.
D. INTRODUCTION OF MERIT AS CRITERIA TO HOLD TOP
MANAGEMENT POSITIONS
The principle of introducing merit as criterion to hold management posi-
tions is in line with the directors’ duties as fiduciaries and agents. This is
buttressed once more by Lord Cranworth’s statement in Aberdeen Rail-
ways Co v. Blaikie Brothers to wit:
The Directors are a body to whom is delegated the duty of man-
aging the general affairs of the Company. A corporate body can
only act by agents, and it is of course the duty of those agents so
to act as best to promote the interests of the corporation whose
affairs they are conducting. Such agents have duties universal to
discharge of a fiduciary nature towards their principal. And it is
a rule of universal application that no one, having such duties to
discharge, shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which
he has, or can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which
102. AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES EXCHANGE (ASX) CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2014), http://www.asx.com.au/documents/
asx-compliance/cgc-principles-and-recommendations-3rd-edn.pdf.
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possibly may conflict with the interest of whom he is bound to
protect.103
The introduction of other criteria other than merit is obviously a negation
of the duties owed by directors to the company because in their dealings
with the company’s assets, tangible or intangible, the directors would be
liable for breach of trust if they misapply them. This would give rise to a
constructive trust in many circumstances104 or to an action against them
for damages or equitable compensation for any loss caused to the com-
pany through the application of anything but the introduction of merit as
criterion to hold top management positions. This will also be in line with
section 172 of the U.K. CA 2006, which provides that a director is ex-
pected to act, in good faith, in the way he considers would be most likely
to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a
whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) for the likely
consequences of any decision in the long term.105 Also, by section 282(1)
of CAMA and section 174 of the U.K. CA, a director is expected to
exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence; these same duties apply to
holders of top management positions in a company. It follows that a de-
parture from merit in the criteria of top management recruitment would
also permeate downstream the organizational structure with adverse con-
sequences on the company both in the short and long run.106
E. INTRODUCTION OF TRANSPARENCY, DUE PROCESS AND
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
The principle of having transparency, due process and disclosure require-
ments embraces the philosophy of “encapsulated trust” and is a basis for
the fiduciary duty of disclosure for the improvement of the integrity and
effectiveness of corporate governance. The tragedy of a lack of trans-
parency, due process and disclosure will invariably threaten the viability
of the burgeoning corporate citizenship which good corporate govern-
ance is meant to promote.
This principle is also in accordance with the principle of separation of
ownership from management. In a modern corporation, professional
103. Aberdeen Railways Co v. Blaikie Brothers, (1854) 1 Macq. 461, 471 (U.K.).
104. Regal v. Gulliver, (l942) 1 All E.R. 378 (Eng.); Boardman v. Phipps, [l967] 2 A.C. 47
(Eng.).
105. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 (U.K.).
106. H. Adamu,  A Comparative Analysis of Directors’ Duties of Care and Skill and Fiduciary
Duties of Loyalty and Good Faith under the Companies’ Acts of Nigeria and the United Kingdom
(2013) (unpublished LL.M. dissertation, Ahmadu Bello Univ., Zaria).
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managers are appointed to run the affairs of the corporation and such
professional managers constitute a distinct group from the owners, who
are under the supervision of the board of directors. The separation of
ownership from management creates the justification for defining an ap-
propriate framework that will ensure transparency, accountability, pro-
bity, integrity and fairness in the management of a corporation.107
VII. MECHANISMS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Corporate governance mechanisms are the inherent policies, guidelines
and control for the management of an organization to minimize conflicts
and reduce inefficiencies. Owners and management use these mecha-
nisms to help managers and employees understand the acceptable behav-
ior in their organization. Corporate governance mechanisms can also
provide motivation factors, goals and objectives that may include incen-
tives to reward everyone in the chain of production for adhering to the
company’s internal operating standards. Common corporate governance
mechanisms include a board of directors, internal controls, balancing
powers, compensation, takeovers, disclosure of information by compa-
nies, shareholdings by managers/directors and so on. These mechanisms
will be discussed further below.
A. BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Large business organizations and publicly quoted companies use a board
of directors as a platform to ensure that the interests of shareholders or
outside investors are earning sufficient financial returns. This is in line
with the legal position of directors as stipulated in section 281 of CAMA,
which holds that directors are trustees of the company and as such shall
exercise their powers honestly in the interest of the company and all the
shareholders.108 Board members are typically voted in by shareholders at
annual meetings.109 Each member serves a set number of years and has
the responsibility to oversee directors and executive managers, create a
mission or vision for the company, set compensation levels for officers,
and deal with any significant internal or external conflicts.110 The board
of directors is typically comprised of some individuals who do not work
107. B.J. Inyang, Nurturing Corporate Governance System: The Emerging Trends in Nigeria, 4
J. BUS. SYSTEMS GOVERNANCE & ETHICS 2 (2009).
108. Companies and Allied Matters Act § 281.
109. D. Yermack, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance, ANN. REV. FIN. ECON.
(2010).
110. Companies and Allied Matters Act § 278.
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directly for the company. This provides an objective opinion for gov-
erning the organization.
B. INTERNAL CONTROLS
Internal controls represent corporate governance mechanisms that are
standard policies and procedures each individual follows within an or-
ganization. These controls help protect and safeguard a company’s busi-
ness or financial information.  Controls are often at the corporate level
because executive managers are responsible for all business operations
and financial reporting. Internal and external audits help to ensure that
these controls are sufficient and do not create an overly restrictive work-
ing environment. Internal controls may also be driven by laws and regu-
lations from government agencies. Companies may need to implement
internal controls to avoid penalties or fines.
C. BALANCING POWER IN AN ORGANIZATION
This is synonymous with the separation of the role of the CEO and the
Board Chairman already discussed above and it is a common set of cor-
porate governance mechanisms. The need to separate the roles of Chair-
man and CEO, is internationally applicable. As the U.K. Combined Code
2003 stipulates, “There should be a clear division of responsibilities at
the head of the company between the running of the board and the execu-
tive responsibility for running the company’s business. No one individual
should have unfettered powers of decision.”111
Also, organizations often set up multiple departments, divisions, and
managers to divide responsibilities and limit the number of tasks one
individual completes. This ensures that no one individual can overextend
the organization’s resources. Creating this checks and balances system
can also create a certain amount of flexibility for companies to add addi-
tional corporate governance mechanisms. This also helps companies
merge subsidiaries into their operations with as few issues as possible.
D. COMPENSATION
Compensation is a performance-based type of management structure.
This corporate governance mechanism offers benefits, such as individual
bonuses, company shares, compensation increases and additional time
off. This helps companies improve performance by offering managers
and individuals the opportunity to personally benefit by working hard in
111. The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, 2003, § 1(A) (U.K.).
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the organization.112 Organizations often use this mechanism to tap into
the creative traits of their employees who can help find new ways to
accomplish tasks and objectives.
E. TAKEOVER
This comes as a form of discipline upon a manager through a replace-
ment with a perceived more efficient one in the management of the com-
pany. It makes managers sit up constantly. This mechanism is, however,
predicated upon the effectiveness of the market for corporate control and
this can be frustrated by defensive tactics by the managers of specific
companies or through governmental intervention.
F. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
Corporate Governance disclosure is a fundamental theme of the modern
corporate regulatory system, which encompasses providing information
by a company to the public in a variety of ways. This helps to properly
monitor directors and managers, some of which may be mandatory or
voluntary. For example, rule 4.10.3 in the Australian Stock Exchange
Listing requires listed companies to disclose their corporate governance
practices.113
G. SHAREHOLDINGS BY DIRECTORS/MANAGERS
This mechanism recommends increased shareholdings by directors/man-
agers as possible incentives to enhance their commitments towards im-
proved corporate performance and properly position them to meet their
social responsibilities as good corporate citizens.114 The reverse is bad
corporate governance with its attendant consequences.
VIII. CONSEQUENCES OF BAD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Arising from the analysis of the code of corporate governance above and
the obvious benefits derivable from good corporate governance, it is also
to be drawn from the analysis of the consequences of bad corporate gov-
ernance not only from the company level but also at macro/systematic
levels. According to Prasad, poor corporate governance is reflected at
112. Elewechi N. M. Okeke, Corporate Governance in Nigeria: the Status Quo, 15 CORP. GOV-
ERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 179 (2007).
113. Australian Stock Exchange, Listing Rule at Guidance Note 8, available at https://
www.asx.com.au/documents/rules/gn08_continuous_disclosure.pdf.
114. B. Ackers, CSR Reporting: What Board of Directors Need to Know, 10 CORP. BD.: ROLE,
DUTIES & COMPOSITION 18 (2014).
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three levels, namely at the company level, macro level and general
level.115 At the company level, poor corporate governance causes an un-
dervaluation of the company’s shares, low confidence in stakeholders
and financiers to bear risk and invest capital and poor quality of manage-
ment which is reflected in overall poor results.116 At the macro level,
poor corporate governance leads to the following consequences: stagna-
tion and slow growth of capital market due to the public’s reluctance to
risk their money; stagnant, stunted individual growth; poor employment
generation; low gross domestic product (GDP) growth; low efforts for
alleviation of poverty; and low human development indicators.117 On a
general level, poor corporate governance normally coexists with a loss of
integrity and incidences of high corruption.118 Thus, corporate govern-
ance is a part of the macroeconomic system of a country and as such, by
and large, corporate governance cannot succeed in the absence of corre-
sponding macroeconomic and public reforms. Good business needs a
hassle free environment, strong legal system and, at macro level, the
right structure where business can flourish.
Based on the above analysis, the failures in corporate governance are a
real threat to the future of every corporation and by extension negatively
influence the concept of corporate citizenship and responsibility. This is
because with effective corporate governance based on core values of in-
tegrity and trust (reputational values)119 companies will have a competi-
tive advantage in attracting and retaining talent and generating positive
reactions in the marketplace. With a reputation for ethical behavior, it
engenders both customer and employee loyalty. With the adoption of a
set of principles and best practices, effective corporate governance can
be achieved. This is also predicated upon fairness, honesty, integrity and
the manner in which companies conduct their affairs. Companies must
make a profit in order to survive and grow; however, the pursuit of profit
must be done within ethical bounds. Companies should adopt policies
that include environmental protection whistle blowing, ethical training
programs and so on. Such compliance mechanisms help develop and
build corporate image and reputation, gain loyalty and trust from con-
sumers and heighten commitment to employees.
115. K. PRASAD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 189 (Princtice-Hall of India Private Ltd. 2006).
116. James N. Obi & I. A. Uwandu, Effect of Poor Corporate Governance on the Performance
of Nigerian Banks, 3 AFR. J. INNOVATIVE RES. & ADVANCED STUD. 1 (2015).
117. M. R. Salam, Corporate Governance in Malaysia: The Macro and Micro Issues, HAND-
BOOK INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE COUNTRY ANALYSES, 24 (2011).
118. E.H. Rasheed & R. Yazdamifard, Corporate Governance As a Solution for Corruption in
Private Sector, 2 GLOBAL J. COM. & MGMT. PERSP. 117 (2013).
119. Easy to Lose, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 2004, at 14.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Corporate governance ensures that an organization is run in a responsible
manner by ensuring accountability, transparency and compliance with
due regard to its key stakeholders. It is the whole set of legal, cultural,
and institutional arrangements that determine what publicly traded corpo-
rations can do, who controls them, how that control is exercised, and
how the risks and returns from the activities they undertake are
allocated.120
Corporate citizenship, which in this context is synonymous with corpo-
rate social responsibility, is the corporate form of self-regulation inte-
grated into the business model to create a positive impact on the
stakeholders and the environment. Corporate citizenship is a concept
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their
business operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders on a
voluntary basis.121
A traditional view suggested a contradiction between corporate citizen-
ship and corporate governance.122 Corporate governance was related to
profit maximization and provided protection to shareholders who have
provided capital to firm, while corporate citizenship apparently was
against profit maximization because it suggested a set of actions benefi-
cial to external stakeholders that may not be good for a shareholder.
However, this is no longer the case, as argued above. Corporate govern-
ance is an umbrella term and corporate citizenship is gradually getting
fused into the company’s corporate governance practices. Their relation-
ship can be interpreted by abandoning the standard view of the firm as a
shareholder value maximizer and embracing the view of a firm as a
stakeholder value maximizer. This convergence paves the way for corpo-
rate governance to be driven by ethical norms and the need for accounta-
bility, and it enables corporate citizenship to adapt prevailing business
practices. Today, both corporate governance and corporate citizenship
focus on ethical practices in business and the responsiveness of an organ-
ization to its stakeholders and the environment in which it operates.
120. W. SUN, J. STEWART & D. POLLARD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & GLOBAL FINANCE CRI-
SIS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, 8 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
121. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, supra note 91.
122. Andrea Beltratti, The Complementarity between Corporate Governance and Corporate So-
cial Responsibility, 30  GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. - ISSUES & PRACTICE, 373-86, 2005.
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Based on the above, it is apt to state that lack of effective corporate
governance at the executive and management level can lead to bad busi-
ness decisions, which can lower the overall value of the company and
make it more difficult for the business to meet its financial obligations
expected of a corporate citizen.
31
Ogbodo and Umoru: Corporate Governance in Nigeria
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2019
32
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 23 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol23/iss1/6
